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Abstract The future holds the possibility to link and
network biobanks, existing biorepositories and reference
databases for research purposes in ways that have not been
possible before. There is the potential to develop ’research
portals’ that will enable researchers to access these research
resources that are located around the globe with the click of
a mouse. In this paper, I will argue that our current gover-
nance system for research is unable to provide all of the
oversight and accountability mechanisms that are required
for this new way of doing research that is based upon ﬂows
of data across international borders. For example, our cur-
rent governance framework for research is nationally based,
with a complex system of laws, policies and practice that
can be unique to a jurisdiction. It is also evident that many
of the nationally based governance bodies in this ﬁeld do
not have the legal powers or expertise to adjudicate on the
complex issues, such as privacy and disclosure risks that are
raised by cross-border data sharing. In addition, the con-
ceptual underpinning of this research governance structure
is based on the ‘‘one researcher, one project, one jurisdic-
tion’’ model. In the conclusion of this paper, I lay out some
preliminary ideas as to how this system has to change to
accommodate research that is based on networks. I suggest
that a move to digital governance mechanisms might be
a start to making research governance systems more
appropriate for the 21st century.
We have entered a new phase in biobanking and genomics
research where infrastructure are being built that will make
it possible to link and network biobanks in a way that has
not been possible before. In the future, there is the potential
for research ‘portals’ to be developed which will provide
gateways into these networks of different infrastructure.
This will make it possible for researchers to make one
enquiry that will enable them to access a number of dif-
ferent biobanks and datasets around the world at once.
Therefore, it is impossible to talk about the future of bio-
banking governance without discussing the research gov-
ernance frameworks in place for medical research as a
whole. These trends in research raise a number of chal-
lenges for our current research governance structure which
is nationally orientated and based on the ‘one researcher,
one project, one jurisdiction’ model. In this paper, I will
argue that our existing research governance frameworks
are unable to provide the level of oversight and account-
ability mechanisms that are required to facilitate this new
way of doing research. The practices, oversight bodies, and
conceptual underpinnings of our current research gover-
nance system are a historical legacy of a previous way of
doing and thinking about research. To develop a research
governance structure that can enable data ﬂows through
networks in an ethical and lawful way, we need to radically
re-think the way that we organise, structure and concep-
tualise international research governance. In the conclusion
of this paper, I will lay out some preliminary ideas of the
steps that need to be taken to bring our research governance
frameworks into the 21st century.
Trends within biobanking
Over the past 10 years there has been an accelerated
growth in the biobanking ﬁeld. Many governments and
funding bodies have encouraged the establishment of large
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dinal cohort studies with the aim of using these as biore-
positories for many research purposes. A great deal of work
has been done by international organisations such as P3G
(http://www.p3g.org/) and ISBER (http://www.isber.org/)
to harmonise standards and approaches to enable sharing
between biobanks. Building on this, the aim of the Bio-
banking and Biomolecular Resources Research Infrastruc-
ture (BBMRI) is to link existing clinical collections to
create a research infrastructure within Europe. The aim is
that national infrastructures will be linked together in one
giant network, using a ‘hubs and spokes’ model based on
individual countries. Such initiatives in biobanking have
been possible because of advances in computer technology
which has increased the ability to categorise, organise and
share samples and data. This has been accompanied by a
growing opinion that commenced with the Human Genome
Project (HGP), that resources funded by the public purse
should be made accessible to as many researchers as pos-
sible, in order to encourage research and development and
maximise the beneﬁts to society. Following the HGP, there
have been a number of open access policies that have
endorsed this approach. These are the Bermuda Agreement
(1996), the Fort Lauderdale Agreement in 2003, the
Toronto Agreement and national policies such as the
National Institute of Health (NIH 2003), Genome Canada
(2005), and the UK Medical Research Council (MRC
2006). The HGP model of ‘doing science’ has developed in
tandem with such policies and has led to a number of
large international sequencing projects (for example, the
Encyclopedia of DNA Elements (ENCODE), the Human
Epigenome Project, the HAPMAP Project and the 1000
Genome Project) that place data openly on the web, as well
as the funding of projects that require the deposition of
sequence data in managed access facilities [such as dbGaP
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/projects/gap/cgi-bin/about.
html) in the USA and the European Genotyping Archive
(European Genotyping Archive: http://www.ebi.ac.uk/ega/
page.php)]. As well as this infrastructure development,
genomic research is increasingly being carried out by large
international consortia funded by a number of countries or
through collaborations that span researchers in many
countries—such as in many of the European Commission
funded projects.
These types of initiatives embody a signiﬁcant change in
the way that scientiﬁc research can now be carried out.
Research is increasingly of a global nature with data and
samples exchanged, accumulated and created through a
number of dynamic research networks and collaborations
that involve multi-disciplinary teams located in different
countries. The role of biobanks and repositories in these
networks is to act as ‘nodes’ on the ﬂow of information
between researchers and institutions enabling data and
samples to be stored, organised and reconﬁgured for the
use in different projects. As plans to develop infrastructure
for biobanks based on a hub and spokes model gains
momentum, appropriate governance methods will need to
be developed that can be used for networks. In the future, it
is likely that we will develop portals that will enable sci-
entists to access these ﬂows of data and samples in a
seamless way. For example, in the social sciences and in
many other ﬁelds, journals are no longer solely in paper
form and the linkage of different journals and datasets is
increasing. This means that it is possible for the individual
to access many datasets through one library portal. The
information that is received may have come from a number
of datasets, but to the person making the enquiry none of
this is evident as they obtain only the information that they
need. The technology to do this for biobanking is here, as
evidenced by powerful search engines such as Google. The
real challenge is being able to organise, manage and ana-
lyse such large sets and amounts of information (Science
Staff 2011) in a way that is useful, allows efﬁcient access
to researchers but also is ethically sound and legally
compliant. This requires new research governance systems
that are global in nature and have the oversight mecha-
nisms to deal with ﬂows of data and samples.
The importance of governance
There are many deﬁnitions of governance and regulation in
the literature, some of which are narrow in scope and
others which are broad. In a forthcoming publication with
my co-authors, we attempt to distinguish the differences
between these two concepts in relation to biobanking
(Kaye et al. 2011). In its broadest sense, governance can be
described as ‘the intentional activity of attempting to
control, order or inﬂuence the behaviour of others (Black
2000), and therefore can cover multiple actors, activities
and mechanisms. It can be distinguished from regulation
that is narrower in scope and applies just to the formal
structures of law and legally constituted regulatory bodies.
Governance can be enacted or carried out through a num-
ber of different mechanisms. In the biobanking ﬁeld this
consists of documents, procedures, people and professional
values and culture. For example, documents such as leg-
islation, regulations, professional guidance and biobank
policies can guide and can sometimes dictate behaviour.
Procedures can be put in place to support the governance
documents and can consist of informal, implicit, institu-
tional norms or ‘the way we do things’, as well as more
formal procedures that maybe required by law or regula-
tory bodies (such as licences and applications for access).
There are also a number of stakeholders within biobanking
ﬁeld that develop the documents and procedures as well as
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be professional leaders in the ﬁeld, advisory boards,
research ethics committees as well as external regulatory
bodies. In addition, the values and culture that are implicit
in a particular context may also inﬂuence the way that
these various elements of governance are enacted.
The beneﬁt of governance is that it promotes certainty
and efﬁciency as people know what the rules are, what
happens, and when. It can ensure uniformity and equal-
ity—that things are done in a uniform way with everyone
and the same issues being treated the same. Such a system
enables problems to be anticipated as there are mechanisms
to deal with the routine issues but unanticipated situations
can also be resolved efﬁciently. Having a governance
system in place ensures that ethical and lawful research is
supported through accountable and transparent decision
making. This not only protects the integrity of the research
community but also has the effect of promoting public
conﬁdence and trust. In a liberal democracy, an effective
governance system is seen as one that embodies the better
regulation principles of proportionality, accountability,
consistency, transparency and targeting (Better Regulation
Task Force 2007). These principles in combination require
that oversight mechanisms are coherent, appropriate and
efﬁcient, and that there are clear lines of accountability for
regulators. Policy objectives and processes of review are
transparent. In addition, the requirement for targeting
means that oversight should be focussed on the problem
and enforcers should predominately focus on those whose
activities give rise to the most serious risks. Many of our
current research governance structures have been devel-
oped in an uncoordinated manner largely in response to the
requirements of national bodies rather than being designed
as part of a systematic global system. Therefore, when we
consider research governance at an international level it
does not meet many of the principles of better regulation
such as coherency and consistency, and being proportion-
ate and targeted.
Current research governance structures
Our current governance structures for research are not
designed for networks and enabling the ﬂow of samples
and data at a global level. Conceptually, our current
research governance systems are parochial, being based
around national boundaries and designed for one research
projects, one researcher and one jurisdiction. Its origins are
in the Nuremberg Trial principles which are intended to
protect individual research participants from physical harm
rather than informational harm. Therefore, the main pur-
pose of the current research governance system is to protect
research participants’ interests and to ensure that research
is carried out ethically. A number of procedures, practices
and oversight bodies have been established that are based
on this design and purpose.
One of the key oversight bodies that are common to
most jurisdictions are research ethics committees or insti-
tutional review boards (IRBs). (For the purpose of this
paper when I refer to ‘research ethics committees’ this
covers all committees that undertake this role). These
bodies have become one of the main gate-keepers that
decide whether a research protocol can proceed and
therefore hold considerable power in the research gover-
nance system. Typically, a detailed proposal that is written
by the principal investigator (or someone familiar with the
study) is submitted to a research ethics committee for
approval. It gives an explanation of the risks and beneﬁts to
the individual participants of involvement in the research
protocol as well as providing the informed consent forms
and information sheets that will be used in the study. If
approved, this is followed by an informed consent process
that involves the signing of an informed consent form by a
research participant before the project commences. As this
is a ‘one project’ model, events in the future such as re-
contact with research participants have to be anticipated
before the research commences and must be stipulated in
the original informed consent form. If further unforseen
research is warranted, samples and data can be anonymised
and approval obtained from a research ethics committee.
However, this is not always desirable or possible.
The problem with this system in terms of oversight is
that it is front-loaded (Gostin and Hodges 1999) as all of
the research uses must be anticipated when the informed
consent form is written and most of the oversight takes
place before the research commences. For example,
informed consent forms must stipulate all future uses of the
data and samples something that is very difﬁcult to do
when these are collected for many different research uses.
The practical solution has been to obtain a broad consent—
that effectively stipulates the ‘rules of the game’ rather that
the speciﬁc type of consent that is required by the Decla-
ration of Helsinki. There is still considerable debate in the
bioethics community as to whether this is ethically sound
and legally compliant (Caulﬁeld and Kaye 2009). The
result is that the consent forms and information forms must
be carefully and meticulously drafted to ensure that they
are future proof. As research ethics committees have very
little powers of enforcement once the approval of the
research protocols have been given, they too need the
application to be very detailed. This scrutiny of the pro-
posal is the only time that a research ethics committee will
get the opportunity to review the proposal in detail and to
make a decision on its merits. Therefore, the concentration
of effort in the governance system becomes focussed on
forms—the research protocol that is submitted to the
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that are given to participants.
The current research governance system has a few
mechanisms in place to ﬁrst determine whether the
research project was carried out according to the original
protocol, but also if, and how, secondary uses of research
data and samples is executed. This system often does not
enable research participants to decide on research uses of
their data and samples, but also has the potential to place
the ethical burden for secondary research on researchers.
Even if national oversight bodies such as research ethics
committees were given the mandate to extend their over-
sight, they do not necessarily have the authority, scope or
expertise to assess the privacy risks associated with global
data sharing or to ensure compliance with their decisions.
To address such concerns new governance solutions have
been developed as Data Access Committees (DACs) have
been established for projects or infrastructures which share
data. Examples of these are found in the Wellcome Trust
Case Control Consortium (WTCCC 2007) in the UK and
dbGAP (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/projects/gap/cgi-bin/
about.html) in the US. While these committees provide
access oversight for speciﬁc projects, they do not provide a
simple solution for a researcher who may want to access
multiple datasets, as individual applications must still be
made to a number of different committees. These special
access committees develop a new tier of oversight in
addition to research ethics committee approval but they do
not enable effective supranational sharing or access. Pro-
ject-based committees responding to individual applica-
tions, like research ethics committees are also not in a
position to judge the privacy risks of multiple access
applications for data from different projects. The effect of
the implementation of DACs is to have placed another
oversight committee with the same limitations as research
ethics committees, further down the data sharing pathway.
The current research governance system does not
address these challenges effectively, as research is being
conducted at a supranational level but governance systems
are nationally based. The ﬁrst major problem for many
international research consortia is that they must conform
to different national legal requirements for the transfer of
samples and data across borders (Kaye 2006; Zika et al.
2008; Schulte in den Ba ¨umen et al. 2010). Sharing is
therefore difﬁcult, as it is impractical and costly to ﬁnd out
what the ethical and legal requirements are in each country.
Even for those who set out to satisfy the legal require-
ments, it may be difﬁcult to ascertain what those require-
ments actually are. For example, within the UK, ‘the
complexity of the law, ampliﬁed by a plethora of guidance,
leaves those who may wish to share data in a fog of con-
fusion’ (Thomas and Walport 2008). For samples, the
difference in the law between jurisdictions is even more
acute, as there is no common overarching European or
global legal instrument. This means that there are different
legal requirements for samples and data between
jurisdictions.
The current governance system also does not meet some
of the basic principles of good regulation. The legacy
system of governance does not meet the requirements of
the new way of doing research that is based on ﬂows of
data and networks. As our current system is front-loaded, it
provides no straight forward and streamlined oversight of
all secondary uses of data. In practice, approval for such
uses is largely being done by researchers, specialist advi-
sory boards attached to individual biobanks and new
oversight bodies such as DACs. All of these boards require
individual applications for access. This means that all
research projects are given the same level of scrutiny,
despite the nature of the research. While the effect of this
has not been fully investigated, such a bespoke system may
have the effect of slowing down the research process
unnecessarily, leading to multiple applications for the same
research protocol to different bodies. Further analysis
needs to be carried out to determine how this research
governance system conforms to the better regulation prin-
ciples described above when it is applied to research net-
works. Based on the above discussion, it appears as if the
current governance structure is not coherent, accountable
or transparent, when applied to global research networks.
Primarily, this is because it is based on the ‘one researcher,
one project, one jurisdiction’ model.
What needs to happen?
The aim of this paper is to start a debate as to what such a
global governance system might look like, and how it
might be constituted. To start this process, there are a
number of ﬁrst steps that need to be undertaken, such as
rethinking the conceptual basis of how we govern research
and how we might use IT systems more creatively as
mechanisms for governance.
To ensure the possibility of research portals and the
sustainability of networks, a number of key changes need
to be made in the way that we conceptualise, align, and
reconstruct our research governance systems. Conceptu-
ally, we need to move away from thinking about gover-
nance as something that is a paper-based system that occurs
at the beginning of the research process. Instead, we should
be thinking in terms of data ﬂows and use pathways to
enable the sharing and access to data. Our current gover-
nance system is based on expert committees that make
decisions and use paper-based forms to establish audit
trails to meet the regulatory requirements of transparency
and accountability. Few of these processes are routine and
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mittees and between jurisdictions. Currently, the norm in
the UK is that there is individual review of all research
proposals by expert committees. As well as moving from a
paper-based system to a digital system, we need to move
from the ‘one researcher, one project, one jurisdiction’
model. This requires that the basis of our governance
system has to move from a focus simply on the ‘local’ to
encompassing global research; to move from paper to
digital governance mechanisms; and to move from the idea
of one research project with one principal investigator to
multiple research projects conducted in global networks.
One possibility is to use information technology as a
form of governance, to direct and only allow certain forms
of behaviour, rather than relying on committee oversight
for each research project. A digital governance system
would enable certain things to happen and prevent
researchers from doing some things—and this could be
done automatically. It could be constructed as pathways or
a maze through which research activities could be directed
and controlled. This requires the building of a global
governance system where some of the governance mech-
anisms are digital to complement existing committee-based
decision making. These digital governance mechanisms
could be designed with ethical, legal and social issues
(ELSI) considerations already embedded within it or ‘ELSI
by design’. The use of digital governance would mean that
only ELSI appropriate behaviours could be undertaken and
therefore the ELSI considerations would be a part of the
governance structure from the earliest stages of thinking
about a research proposal through to the ﬁnalisation of a
research proposal. Such a structure could complement the
nationally based regulatory systems and legal require-
ments, and could provide a bridge between nationally
based systems.
This requires the development of a global system of
governance, that does not seek to throw away all of the
principles or mechanisms that have been developed over
time. For instance, the roles of expert review committees
are important mechanisms for dealing with research pro-
posals that raise new ELSI challenges. However, they do
not need to be used for every new research project. Instead,
a combination of triaging, digital governance and expert
committee review could be used. Also research has been
founded upon principles such as respect for participants, do
no harm and the promotion of high standards of profes-
sionalism and research integrity. It would be inappropriate
to reject such values as they have provided a sound basis
for research and have lead to the widely spread public trust
that exists. However, these principles may need to be
rethought as to how they apply to global research. We also
need to articulate the basis for the social contract that can
underpin global networks for research.
There are a number of initiatives that are already under-
way that could form the basis of a digital global governance
system. DataSHIELD (http://www.p3gobservatory.org/data
shield/summary.htm) is a project aimed at developing a
method and an IT interface to provide access to research
results via simultaneous parallelized analysis of the individ-
ual-level, harmonised data of each study (Wolfson et al.
2010). Under DataSHIELD only anonymous summary-sta-
tistics, results or aggregate information can be shared with
other researchers in other institutions. This means that indi-
vidual-level data never leaves the collecting organisation and
there is no breach of European data protection law or
research governance requirements. Thus, DataSHIELD pro-
vides a simple approach to analysing individual-level data in
pooled analyses, while enabling researchers to carry out
research in an ethical and lawful manner.
The ENCORE project (http://www.encore-project.info/
index.html) is aimed at developing a system where indi-
vidual consent can be obtained from research partici-
pants—not just at the beginning of the consent process but
on a continuous basis (Bramhall et al. 2011). This use of
information technologies allows a more continuous and
interactive relationship with participants—or a dynamic
consent—rather than the one off broad consent that is
currently the only practical solution for many projects or
biobanks. The use of a patient ID would allow patient
samples and data to be tracked across research studies to
remove bias and erroneous identiﬁcation provide a mech-
anism for re-contacting individuals for recruitment into
new studies, and could be used as a basis for cutting down
on research ethics oversight for secondary research. There
is the potential for this system to be used as an accredita-
tion system that would mean that projects that used
ENCORE would be exempt from some oversight hurdles,
such as full ethical review. However, the parameters of
what would be acceptable for research participants and
researchers still need to be identiﬁed and developed into
policy before this would be operationalised.
There is the potential to use digital identiﬁers as gover-
nance tools. The ORCID ID (http://www.orcid.org) is cur-
rently being developed to track individual researchers’
publications. However, this could also be used as part of a
digital governance system. For example, an ORCID IDs
could be used to strengthen and streamline governance
mechanisms related to data access. They could be used to
verify a researcher’s bonaﬁdes in conjunction with extra
automated layers of individual validation if necessary (such
as passwords, security cards, secure number generator
devices) when applying for access to data sets and/or
seeking research ethics approval, and then monitoring
appropriate use of the data by that researcher (Thorisson
2011). A second identiﬁer is also being developed for bio-
banks. The concept behind bioresource research impact
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biobanks or other repositories (Cambon-Thomsen et al.
2011). This would enable a unique identiﬁer to be attached
to such resources. This unique identiﬁer could be used to
cite and acknowledge the use of bio-resources in publica-
tions and funding grants and in doing so measure their
impact.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to articulate some of the
challenges that networks for research pose for our current
governance system. I have argued that these oversight
systems are built upon the ‘one researcher, one project, one
jurisdiction’ model of research that does not apply to the
new way of carrying out research through networks. We
are moving to a future where biobanks, existing biorepos-
itories and reference databases will be linked and net-
worked for research purposes in ways that has not been
possible before. Our current governance system for
research is unable to provide the oversight and account-
ability mechanisms that are required for this new and
expedited way of doing research. However, this does not
mean that the existing system should be thrown away, but
rather that we use e-governance mechanisms to improve
the existing governance system for research. This paper has
not attempted to provide all the solutions to these chal-
lenges which will involve a concerted effort by many.
Rather the intention is to start the debate that is needed to
stimulate further thinking on this subject to provide the
basis for action. In this way, we may move to a governance
system that is more in tune with the way that research is
being carried out and planned in the 21st century.
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